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 A B S T R A C T  
This study aims to describe the dynamics of potential whistleblowers 
for fraud in village fund management. This research was conducted in 
all villages in the Kledung Subdistrict, Temanggung Regency as the 
largest tobacco producing area in Indonesia. The design of the study 
used descriptive qualitative with informants in the entire village of 
Kledung Subdistrict, Temanggung Regency, Central Java, Indonesia. 
The results of the study showed that in managing village funds, 
whistleblowers for fraudulent management of village funds could be 
carried out because of the courage of village fund managers. The 
challenges faced by whistleblowers are the need for mechanisms and 
safe reporting channels. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Kledung Subdistrict, Temanggung 
Regency is the largest tobacco producing 
region in Indonesia, receiving an allocation 
of village funds with a total budget of 2017 
of Rp 207.45 billion more. The amount of 
village funds obtained in 2017 is greater than 
the acquisition in 2016 of IDR 164.4 billion. 
The increase in village funds in Temanggung 
Regency is quite significant, therefore with 
this large fund it is expected that the Village 
Head and village officials can manage the 
funds in accordance with procedures. 
 This phenomenon shows that the 
distribution of village funds in Temanggung 
Regency is often misused by irresponsible 
parties to obtain personal benefits. The 
alleged corruption case for the purchase of 
crooked replacement land originating from 
the APBD was carried out by Eko Prabowo, 
namely Kades Jumo, Jumo Subdistrict, 
Temanggung Regency in 2012, the purchase 
budget for crooked replacement of the 
village head used to build the Progo Pistan 
Dam, Rp 243,939,000 from the Regency 
APBD was used for personal interests. the 
suspect, so that the replacement head of the 
village head was not paid 
(www.suaramerdeka.com). Temanggung 
Regency with 20 sub-districts and 266 
villages still has a poor village fund 
management system. All villages in 
Temanggung Regency have so far not 
implemented the village financial system 
(siskeudes) application from the Financial 
and Development Supervisory Agency 
(BPKP). Human Resources (HR) is referred 
to as the main obstacle for not running the 
program (www.merdeka.com). Therefore, 
village funds for Temanggung Regency, 
Central Java until mid-March 2017 cannot be 
disbursed because no village in the area has 
yet to submit a report on the use of village 
funds for the 2016 fiscal year 
(www.metrotvnews.com). 
 The disclosure of the various cases 
did not escape a person who had the courage 
to reveal the existence of fraud in the 
organization, namely the whistleblower. 
Specific definitions of whistleblowers are 
explained in the Supreme Court Circular 
Letter (SEMA) Number 4 of 2011 point-8 
explaining that whistleblowers are people 
who know and report certain criminal acts as 
referred to in this SEMA and are not part of 
the crime behavior reported. Whistleblowers 
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must provide clear and specific evidence and 
information in the event of fraud so that it is 
easy to follow up. Whistleblower reports will 
be difficult to follow up without adequate 
information and clear evidence because a 
whistleblower can get terror from people 
who don't like his existence. 
 Research by Hwang et al. (2008) for 
the impact of culture on the current and 
future intentions of accountants and 
professional auditors to become 
whistleblowers in the socio-cultural context 
of China. Elias (2008) examined the attitude 
of auditing students in the US regarding 
whistleblowing. The effect of reward models 
in encouraging individuals to report 
wrongdoing has been proven by Xu and 
Ziegenfuss (2008) which proves that internal 
auditors have a greater tendency to report 
wrongdoing when given awards. Taylor 
(2015) said that monetary incentives are 
considered insufficient to guarantee 
whistleblowers to be safe from the threat of 
wrongdoing. In addition to awards, 
anonymous reporting mechanisms 
encourage effective whistleblowing. In the 
case of village fund management, 
whistleblowing for fraudulent village funds 
is interesting to study. How is the dynamics 
and challenges of whistleblowing in the 
fraud of village fund management in all 
villages in Kledung Subdistrict, 
Temanggung Regency. The results of the 
study are expected to provide information 
and help stakeholders interested in 
designing whistleblowing. 
 
LITERATURE STUDY 
Whistleblower 
 Whistleblowing is an attempt to 
achieve an economic and social goal, so that 
the perpetrators expect support from various 
parties so that these goals are achieved. 
Whistleblowers face many threats such as 
retaliation (Liyanarachichi and Newdick, 
2009; Arnold and Ponemon, 1991; Elliston, 
1982; Elliston and Coulson, 1982). Miceli and 
Near (1985) state that there are four 
characteristics of people who can be called 
whistleblowers, namely (1) employees or 
former employees of an organization whose 
organization is cheated; (2) does not have the 
power to stop or change the fraud under its 
control; (3) approved or not approved to 
make a report; (4) does not hold a position 
whose task requires reporting corporate 
fraud. 
 Whistleblowing reporting can occur 
through internal and external channels. 
Whistleblowing reporting through internal 
channels occurs when an employee becomes 
aware of fraud committed by another 
employee and then reports the fraud to his 
supervisor. Meanwhile, whistleblowing 
reporting through external channels occurs 
when an employee is aware of fraud 
committed by the organization or members 
in the organization, then reveals it to parties 
outside the organization or law enforcement 
because the fraud is detrimental to the 
community (Elias 2008). Park and 
Blenkinsopp (2009) describe that 
whistleblowing reporting paths do not only 
use internal and external channels, but 
consist of three dimensions, namely 
anonymous and identified, formal and 
informal, internal and external, each of these 
dimensions is a choice for employees. 
Whistleblowers behave differently in making 
comparable reporting path choices for them. 
The results of research conducted by Kaplan 
(2012) indicate that reporting of participant 
intentions in terms of anonymous or 
identified pathways is influential when 
considering retaliation. 
 Research conducted by Alleyne et al. 
(2013) states that perceived organizational 
support perceived is one of the factors that 
support an individual to report unethical 
actions in his organization. Individuals must 
assess the level of support expected when 
deciding to report any errors, given the 
various negative impacts that arise if the lack 
of support from the organization. 
 Kaplan et al. (2009) provide empirical 
findings that the effectiveness of anonymous 
reporting channels depends on the level at 
which employees find fraud or hints at fraud 
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and the desire of employees to report their 
findings to the right recipient. Anonymous 
reporting channels are considered more 
effective in preventing impending fraud. 
Seifert et al. (2010) tested the effectiveness of 
anonymous reporting channels in the reward 
model. 
 
Cheating on Village Fund Management 
 Law No. 6 of 2014 concerning 
villages explains that villages are given a 
great deal of flexibility to regulate their own 
governance and development so that 
villagers have increased welfare and quality 
of life. In addition, the village government 
was asked to be more independent to 
manage the government and various natural 
resources owned, including the management 
of village finances and assets. The role that is 
accepted for the village is very large, it must 
be accompanied by a large responsibility as 
well, therefore the village government must 
be able to use the principle of accountability 
in its governance. 
 Government Regulation No. 6 of 2004 
article 1 paragraph 2 explains that village 
funds are funds originating from the State 
Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBN) 
given to villages transferred through the 
Regency / City Regional Revenue and 
Expenditure Budget, where these village 
funds are used to finance government 
operations, implementation of development, 
community empowerment and community 
development. These village funds are 
channeled in stages by the government 
through the State General Cash Account 
(RKUN) to district / city regional 
governments through the Regional General 
Cash Account (RKUD). Then the district / 
city regional government also distributes to 
the village through the Village Cash Account 
(RKD) after the village government has 
submitted documents such as the Village 
Regulation on the current APB and a report 
on the realization of the use of the previous 
stage of village funds (www.djpk.depkeu.go 
.id). 
 DD Management in Presidential 
Regulation No. 60 Regarding Village Funds 
article 2 reads Village Funds are managed in 
an orderly manner, obedient to the 
provisions of the legislation, efficient, 
economical, transparent, and responsible 
with due regard to a sense of fairness and 
propriety and prioritize the interests of the 
local community. 
Regulation of the Minister of Finance 
Number 49 concerning Procedures for 
Allocation, Distribution, Use, Monitoring 
and Evaluation of Village Funds Article 22 
paragraph 2 reads that the implementation 
of activities financed by Village Funds is 
preferably carried out in a self-managed 
manner using local resources / raw 
materials, and strived to absorb more labor 
work from the local village community. The 
Head of the Village Government is the 
Village Head who holds the power in 
managing village finances. Government 
Regulation Number 72 of 2005 article 68 
regulates, the source of the budget provided 
for villages comes from the Regency / City 
APBD. The component that is allocated at 
least 10% of the central and regional 
financial balance funds received by the 
Regency / City is the tax and natural 
resource revenue-sharing fund, plus the 
General Allocation Fund (DAU) after 
deducting personnel expenditure. The fraud 
in village fund management can be 
explained by the fraud triangle. The concept 
explains that the factors causing fraud are 
the presence of pressure, opportunity and 
rationalization (Cressey 1966). 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Research design 
 This research is a qualitative 
descriptive study. The location of this 
research was conducted in all villages in 
Kledung Subdistrict, Temanggung Regency. 
The data source in this study uses primary 
data that is data obtained directly. This 
study uses an interview method which is 
conducted by asking questions directly with 
village officials and village community 
leaders. 
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 The analysis is carried out by 
organizing the results of interviews in 
transcripts, mapping and in-depth review 
based on literature review and the results of 
previous research. The results of the study 
are then interpreted and narrated in the 
presentation of phenomena and the 
synthesis of the results of previous research. 
Data validity testing is done by comparing 
the results of interviews with one source 
with other sources, and comparing the 
results of interviews with applicable 
regulations. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
General Overview of Kledung District 
 Interviews have been conducted with 
village officials throughout the village of 
Kledung Sub-District which was the location 
of the study. The Kledung Subdistrict Area 
which is one of 20 sub-districts in 
Temanggung Regency is bordered by: West 
Area with Wonosobo Regency, North Region 
with Bansari District, East Parakan District 
and Bulu District and South with Magelang 
Regency. The Kledung Subdistrict area is 
located at an average land height of 1,138 m 
above sea level, with a maximum 
temperature of 29 degrees celsius and a 
minimum temperature of 18 degrees celsius. 
The average number of rainy days is 64 days 
and the amount of rainfall is 22 mm / year. 
 Based on the 2012 registration in 
Kledung District with a population of 24,770 
people, a population density of 765 per Km2. 
Most of the residents of Kledung Sub-Village 
have a livelihood as farmers. The area of 
Kledung Subdistrict is 3,221 Ha consisting of 
247 Ha of Paddy and Non-Paddy Paddy of 
2,974 Ha. Kledung Subdistrict Temanggung 
Regency in the division of Administration 
area is divided into 13 Villages, 37 Hamlets, 
157 RT, 39 RW, with the number of Village 
Heads 13, 141 village apparatuses and 99 
BPD members. 
 
Profile of Village Fund Management in Kledung 
District 
 Village Funds for all villages in 
Kledung Sub-District are sourced from the 
central government or APBN aimed at the 
whole community which aims to develop a 
village and community welfare that is used 
for government administration, 
development, empowerment and 
community development. The distribution of 
funds in 2017 is divided into two stages, 
namely in April 60% and in October 40%. As 
stated in the Regulation of the Minister of 
the Village no.5 of 2015 that the priority of 
the use of village funds is for the field of 
village development and community 
empowerment, the use of village funds in all 
villages in the Kledung District has also 
prioritized these two fields. 
 Village fund management starts from 
the planning discussed in the Village 
Development Plan Deliberation Forum, 
where all levels of society are included to 
realize participatory development and 
accommodate the aspirations of the village 
community, then used as a reference for 
preparing RKPDes and APBDes and 
stipulated in the Village Regulation as a 
development guide in the village 
development guidelines village. In carrying 
out the activities, the funds received by all 
villages in Kledung Subdistrict were handed 
over to the Activity Implementation Team 
(TPK) to manage which would later be held 
accountable to the village head. The activity 
implementation team can consist of village 
officials, youth clubs and village 
communities. The implementation of 
activities also prioritizes the use of local 
resources and absorbs more local workers as 
contained in PMK No. 49 Article 22 (2) 
which reads that the implementation of 
activities financed from the Village Fund is 
preferably carried out in a self-managed 
manner using local resources / raw 
materials , and strived to absorb more labor 
from the local village community. 
 
Potential Whistleblowing in Village Fund 
Management 
 In managing village funds there is 
potential for fund utilization. This can be 
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prevented by reporting fraud. An action in 
this case reporting fraud must be preceded 
by an intention. In Theory of Planned 
Behavior (TPB), intention is a process of 
someone to show behavior. Someone will 
have an intention in him to do something 
before the person actually shows the 
behavior that he wants to show. According 
to this theory it can be seen that the intention 
is manifested from the attitude towards a 
behavior, subjective norms, and perception 
of control over behavior (Ajzen 1991). 
Attitude that is as a response and confidence 
of someone towards something that is 
beneficial or less favorable to perform the 
behavior to be determined. Subjective 
Norms are the influence or pressure from 
outsiders on individuals to display a certain 
behavior. 
  In the process of implementing 
village fund management, village officials in 
all villages in the Kledung Sub-district 
region have never found any problems with 
large amounts of money or misappropriation 
of village funds. So far there has never been 
fraud in the management of village funds, 
but village officials often make 
administrative errors in managing village 
funds due to lack of human resources. The 
treasurer of the village of Petarangan 
expressed his opinion in the results of the 
interview as follows: 
 "... So far there hasn't been any cheating, 
sis, Grandmother miscalculated, for example, 
maybe yes, sometimes also calculating my taxes, 
so it's complicated because I also learned because 
it was only in 2017 that the village treasurer 
continued, but you're still learning. If there is an 
error so far the most is overcome with the 
minutes of your event ". 
 Although currently there is no fraud 
in the village of Kledung Subdistrict in the 
management of village funds, if there is 
fraud there are eight villages that have the 
desire to report fraud while the other five 
villages have no desire to report the fraud. 
The Jambu Village Secretary expressed his 
opinion in the results of the interview as 
follows: 
 "... Of course I will report, because if 
there is fraud I will certainly be dragged as well, I 
will also be responsible for all of you. I have done 
that right, but at the provincial level there is 
cheating if I don't report what? after all they 
were hit by me must also be claimed 
responsibility too miss, why am I afraid to 
report? Yes, I will report it, right?” 
 Canggal Village Secretary stated that 
he is ready to report if there is fraud in the 
management of village funds: 
 "... For example, there is fraud, we are 
ready to report, for example the misuse of our 
budget is ready because it is not according to 
plan, all of us have a basis. because we are the 
system, this year we really work, we are 
according to the rules.” 
 The Secretary of Kwadungan gunung 
Village also stated that he intends to report if 
there is fraud in order to have a red effect for 
those who commit fraud in the management 
of village funds: 
 "... If I knew, I would definitely report it. 
The problem is that in the village administration, 
transparency must also be given to the citizens, 
so every year we report it to the residents and 
institutions in the village, if we don't report it 
later, it will continue.” 
 The same thing was conveyed by the 
village officials of Kwadungan cliff, Tuksari, 
Jeketro, Kruwisan and Kledung that they 
had the intention to report fraud because 
they wanted to provide lessons for those 
who committed fraud, that in fact such acts 
must indeed be cleared because they 
violated the rules and could be detrimental 
to many parties and funds that are corrupted 
is state money so it involves accountability 
to the public. 
 Unlike the five villages in Kledung 
Subdistrict, the application of 
Whistleblowing is still very weak. Village 
officials are still reluctant to report if there is 
fraud because they do not have the heart to 
report their superiors or coworkers and also 
have an apathy to report if fraud occurs. The 
treasurer of the village of Petarangan stated 
that disclosure of fraud was not possible. He 
expressed his opinion in the results of the 
interview: 
 "... I will not report it, there is already 
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someone watching, it is not necessary to just 
report it. But I think there is no sister who 
cheated, the police have already entered, the sub-
district has entered, the district has also entered, 
every month is also monitored, right? If for the 
problem of cheating, you can't answer the 
problem, it seems like it doesn't exist and it's 
never been either.” 
 Kalirejo Village Finance Section 
added his opinion in the interview results, 
namely: 
 "... I don't think that there's something 
like that, either. If cheating also happens right 
then we still know everything and the public 
knows. Especially mbak village, in that village the 
person is very close between friends and friends 
or the neighbors are very close to each other, not 
like a city person so if there is anything it would 
not bear.” 
 Dissenting opinions were found in 
the results of interviews with respondents in 
all villages of Kledung Subdistrict. It can be 
seen that there are village officials who 
intend to become whistleblowers and there 
are those who do not intend to become 
whistleblowers in managing village funds. 
 Behavior intention is what 
determines a person's decision to carry out 
or not carry out a behavior. Theory of 
planned behavior explains that the behavior 
carried out by someone arises due to the 
intention to behave. As explained in this 
theory, when a person has a positive 
attitude, he will have the intention to do that, 
whereas when someone has a negative 
attitude, he will not have the intention to do 
so. The interview results showed that eight 
village officials in Kledung Subdistrict had a 
positive attitude towards reporting fraud. 
The village officials consider that reporting 
fraud is beneficial because it is in accordance 
with religion and also his belief that 
reporting fraud in the village means that it 
will help law enforcement and accountability 
to the public so as not to harm many parties. 
With this positive attitude it can be said that 
if fraud occurs they intend to report fraud.  
 Unlike the five other villages in 
Kledung Subdistrict, they have an apathetic 
attitude that is indifference or indifference to 
reporting fraud in managing village funds 
because of personal interests. Village officials 
consider that supervision from outside 
parties is sufficient because later they will 
find out if someone commits fraud so there 
is no need to report fraud. Village officials 
also do not intend to report fraud because of 
the feeling of embarrassment experienced 
when reporting coworkers or people who 
are respected in the village. This is what 
cannot foster their intention to report fraud. 
 In connection with the intention to 
report fraud, if there is fraud in the village 
first approach is carried out as a friend then 
a consultation is held in the village if it can 
still be corrected or can still be returned then 
it is forgiven and given advice so as not to 
repeat again but if ignored and not 
responsible answer then they really do 
reporting fraud to the authorities namely the 
police. 
 Next are the respondents' answers 
regarding the media used by village officials 
if they intend to report fraud. The treasurer 
of the village of Kledung said: 
 "... Suppose we have been cheating in our 
village, we have discussed it first, for example in 
a village meeting, it is enough, it is closed until 
there. For example, there is a discussion, but from 
the perpetrator there is still no responsibility, 
maybe we report it to the police, Ma'am.” 
 The Jambu village secretary also 
provides an opinion regarding the media 
used if reporting fraud: 
 "... What I initially did was yes, maybe 
report to the village head of course, before 
reporting to the village head I did a study first 
whether it was true because I didn't want to 
confront a problem that was not necessarily true. 
If it's really wrong, we should report it, after that 
we discuss it at the government level, we report 
to the sub-district, after that, there will be a 
follow-up, I will certainly like that.” 
 As explained by Elias (2008) that 
whistleblowing reporting through internal 
channels occurs when an employee knows 
the fraud committed by another employee 
and then reports the fraud to his supervisor. 
While whistleblowing reporting through 
external channels occurs when an employee 
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is aware of fraud and then discloses it to 
parties outside the organization or law 
enforcement because the fraud is detrimental 
to the community. This is also done by 
village officials in the Kledung Subdistrict if 
they intend to report fraud then they will 
report through internal channels, first 
reporting to their superiors and conducting 
consultations in the village and also through 
external channels, namely reporting to law 
enforcement if it is proven guilty. 
 Related to the support of the closest 
people (family and friends) in encouraging 
the intention to report fraud, not all 
informants in the Kledung sub-district 
support to report fraud. Some informants in 
Kledung Subdistrict said the family 
supported positive actions including 
reporting fraud while not harming 
themselves and the family. In addition, other 
village officials also support reporting fraud 
to make the village better provided the 
reporting has strong evidence rather than 
slander. This can also foster their intention to 
report fraud as stated by the Treasurer of the 
village of Kledung: 
 "... As long as it's good, the family 
supports you as long as it doesn't harm us". 
 The village secretary of Kwadungan 
Gunung also said that family and closest 
friends provide support to report if there is 
fraud in the management of village funds: 
 "... Surely if a certainty of truth is 
supported, it is important to report that what is 
reported is not slander, it must be in accordance 
with the reality of existing data funds. Now, 
there are a lot of reports making it up, apparently 
when it is checked in the field, it is not 
appropriate ”. 
 In contrast to some other villages in 
the Kledung sub-district related to the views 
or attitudes of those closest to reporting 
fraud. Families and other village officials do 
not provide support to report fraud because 
they have a fear of harming themselves and 
the village. This also cannot foster their 
intention to report fraud. As stated by the 
secretary of the village of Canggal: 
 "... For example, if this is actually more 
afraid, with the village funds only the family and 
the closest people are actually afraid. I am afraid 
like this with the laws getting tighter, the 
regulations getting tighter, the supervision is 
getting tighter, the family is afraid, afraid that 
there will be an error in administration ". 
 Paponan village secretary said that 
he did not have the support of the family to 
report fraud because he had never told the 
problem that occurred in the office to the 
family: 
 "... For the time being I have never 
reported to you so I have never known anything 
like that. I, if it is an office matter, I never tell my 
family, at the office, at the office, at home, the 
others are like that.” 
 The village treasurer Petarangan also 
said that other village officials did not 
directly support to report fraud: 
 "... We also, if there is a report, it might 
not be directly supported, maybe it will be 
clarified first. If all this time I think for example 
there are indications of cheating, it might also be 
unintentional because we also process so much 
funds but it is really not right, even though the 
laws must be correct while we don't understand 
exactly. So for example, if the exact kudu is 
wrong and must be punished, I do not agree that 
it is better not to send village funds to the village, 
it's better to reject the invitation.” 
 As explained also in Theory of 
Planned Behavior (TPB) that when they have 
a belief that a behavior is acceptable to their 
environment or vice versa, then the 
individual will have the intention to show a 
behavior. The interview results show that 
not all village officials in Kledung Subdistrict 
have confidence that reporting fraud will be 
received in their neighborhood. This can be 
seen that some village officials do not have 
the support of families and other village 
officials. The village officials believe that the 
people closest to them have a fear of 
harming themselves and the village if they 
report the fraud. But it is different from some 
other village officials in Kledung District. 
The village officials have confidence that 
reporting fraud will be accepted in their 
neighborhood. This can be seen from the 
support of the family and from other village 
officials. The village officials believe that the 
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people closest to them do not approve of 
fraud because it can harm the village so they 
will support the decision of village officials 
in reporting the fraud. 
 In the context of perceived behavioral 
control, village officials in Kledung sub-
district felt that not all villages were given a 
great opportunity to report fraud if it 
occurred. Some village officials in Kledung 
Subdistrict said that in their village reporting 
fraud was easy because they were told that if 
they found fraud, please report it with clear 
evidence, as stated by the treasurer of the 
village of Kledung: 
 "... Give a chance to report, it is 
impossible to take that for example if it has been 
deliberated but from the perpetrators there is no 
accountability or no red effect, so just report it. 
The presence or absence of protection has no effect 
on my intentions to report. If there is fraud I still 
have the desire to report because it is for the good 
of the village.” 
 In contrast to the Kalirejo Village 
apparatus, respondents said that in their 
village reporting fraud was not easy: 
 "... Surely it's not easy if it's still 
possible to be consulted, yes, we should discuss it 
later, how about peace, because we also don't 
have the heart to do it. Protection is not a factor 
that affects me, even if there is protection for 
reporting cheating, if actually I don't dare to 
miss it, but it doesn't feel good for work friends, 
that's why we just go back to the community.” 
 In Theory of planned Behavior (TPB) 
also explains a person's intention to behave 
is determined by how he perceives the level 
of ease or difficulty to behave. When 
someone believes that what he is doing is the 
result of self-control, then the individual will 
have the intention to show a behavior. The 
dynamics of whistleblowing can be 
demonstrated by the desire to report fraud, 
but also experience the challenge that 
reporting fraud is difficult because the 
organization does not provide a great 
opportunity to report fraud. The fraud 
reporting mechanism is still not clearly 
understood by village fund managers. 
 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND 
SUGGESTIONS 
Conclusions 
 The dynamics of whistleblowing for 
fraud in managing village funds shows that 
there are eight village officials in Kledung 
Subdistrict who intend to report the fraud, 
but five village officials who do not intend to 
report the fraud. The intention to report 
fraud arises because village officials have a 
positive attitude towards reporting fraud. 
Village officials also receive support from 
families while the action does not harm 
themselves or their families and also other 
village officials support in reporting fraud to 
make the village better. Furthermore, the 
intention to report also arises because village 
officials believe that in their village reporting 
fraud is easy to do. 
 The challenge of whistleblowing on 
fraud in village fund management is the 
internal factors of village officials, namely 
apathy towards reporting fraud and also 
having a feeling of reluctance when 
reporting coworkers or respected people in 
his village. External factors in the form of 
reporting mechanisms and safe reporting 
methods pose a whistleblowing challenge. In 
the context of village funds, consideration of 
cultural factors needs to be a concern in 
implementing effective whistleblowing. 
 
Limitations and Suggestions 
 The limitation in this study is that 
this study obtained information from 
informants who were limited to 
representatives of village fund management. 
This research has not focused on local 
wisdom factors that exist in the Kledung 
area. Future research can examine in depth 
the mechanism of whistleblowing by paying 
attention to existing local wisdom in an area. 
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